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ASCERTAINABILITY IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT:  
NAME THAT CLASS MEMBER 
Daniel Luks* 
 
The 1966 amendment of Rule 23 provided plaintiffs with an extremely 
powerful procedural device.  Since then, much controversy has surrounded 
Rule 23.  Judges have often shown hostility towards certification of 
frivolous class actions that result in large fees for attorneys but little 
recovery for class members.  The Third Circuit has recently used the 
requirement that a class be ascertainable to create an extremely high bar 
for certification of small-claims consumer class actions.  Such class actions 
in the Third Circuit are essentially fruitless unless a plaintiff can 
individually identify all potential class members prior to class certification.  
The Third Circuit is the first circuit court to use ascertainability to create a 
bar to class certification.  Class certifications will vary widely depending 
on whether or not the circuit in which the class action is brought has 
adopted the Third Circuit’s interpretation of ascertainability. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Kashi Brand, a producer of a variety of health foods, claimed to use only 
natural, simple ingredients in many of its products.1  When purchasers of 
Kashi products discovered that it used a wide array of artificial ingredients, 
they filed a class action complaint.2  The complaint alleged that Kashi 
engaged in deceptive advertising by saying that its products contained no 
artificial ingredients.3 
After determining that all of the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23 were met, a judge in the Southern District of California 
certified a class of all California consumers who had purchased a Kashi 
product with a label claiming “Nothing Artificial” on or after August 24, 
2007.4  Kashi had argued that the class could not be certified because no 
records existed that allowed for easy identification of class members.5  The 
court rejected this argument, noting, “If class actions could be defeated 
because membership was difficult to ascertain at the class certification 
stage, ‘there would be no such thing as a consumer class action.’”6 
Had Astiana v. Kashi Co. been brought in the Third Circuit, the consumer 
class would almost certainly have not been certified under 
that circuit’s recent ascertainability doctrine jurisprudence.7  Traditionally, 
ascertainability requires that a class be identifiable and “susceptible of 
precise definition.”8  Under this standard, the Kashi class above satisfies 
ascertainability.9  Although the requirement does not receive much 
discussion, a recent string of Third Circuit cases has emphasized the 
importance of ascertainability in small-claims consumer class actions.10  
These cases make clear that to bring a damages class action in the Third 
 
 1. See Astiana v. Kashi Co., 291 F.R.D. 493 (S.D. Cal. 2013). 
 2. See id. at 499. 
 3. See id. 
 4. Id. at 510. 
 5. See id. at 500. 
 6. Id. (quoting Ries v. Ariz. Beverages USA LLC, 287 F.R.D. 523, 536 (N.D. Cal. 
2012)). 
 7. See, e.g., Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 303 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 8. Jason Steed, On “Ascertainability” As a Bar to Class Certification, 23 APP. ADVOC. 
626, 627 (2011). 
 9. See Astiana, 291 F.R.D. at 500–01. 
 10. See Carrera, 727 F.3d 300; Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349 (3d Cir. 
2013); Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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Circuit, a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the 
existence of an administratively feasible mechanism that allows the court to 
identify all potential class members.11  Several scholars have recently 
argued that the Third Circuit’s approach to ascertainability presents a 
drastic shift in the application of the doctrine and creates a nearly 
impossible bar for the certification of many small-claims consumer class 
actions.12  This new approach to ascertainability provides defendants a 
powerful tool to defeat class certification in most small-claims consumer 
class actions.13 
This Note explains the previously unacknowledged ascertainability split 
in detail.  Then, this Note argues that the Third Circuit’s approach is not 
correct, because ascertainability developed as a doctrine to ensure that a 
class be defined with precision.  Ascertainability demands a class 
definition, which allows the court to identify class members based on 
objective criteria.  The doctrine ensures the effectiveness of claim 
preclusion as to class adjudication and that damages go to individuals 
actually harmed by the defendant.  However, it should not require that all 
class members be identified prior to certification. 
Part I of this Note briefly explains class action certification requirements 
and identifies theories explaining the purposes of class actions.  Part II 
introduces the split regarding ascertainability and discusses the background 
of the doctrine.  Part III describes the arguments for and against the Third 
Circuit’s novel approach.  Finally, Part IV argues that ascertainability 
should ensure the successful application of claim preclusion to any final 
class judgment. 
I.  GENERAL BACKGROUND OF CLASS ACTIONS 
Before addressing the unacknowledged split regarding ascertainability, a 
brief overview of the class action device is necessary.  Part I.A describes 
underlying motives of the class action device.  Part I.B sets forth the 
requirements for class certification.  Lastly, Part I.C addresses the 
development of ascertainability as well as the traditional understanding of 
what is needed to satisfy the doctrine. 
 
 
 
 11. See Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307–08. 
 12. Brief for Professors of Civil Procedure and Complex Litigation et al. As Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 3, Carrera, 727 F.3d 300 (No. 12-2621), 2013 WL 
4437225 [hereinafter Law Professors’ Brief]. 
 13. See Nicole Skolout, Carrera v. Bayer Corporation:  Third Circuit Vacates Class 
Certification Order on Ascertainability Grounds in Consumer False Advertising Case, 
MONDAQ (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/260302/Class+Actions/
Carrera+v+Bayer+Corporation+Third+Circuit+Vacates+Class+Certification+Order+On+As
certainability+Grounds+In+Consumer+False+Advertising+Case. 
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A.  The Purpose of Class Actions 
American courts first used the representative suit device to ensure that 
large groups of individuals with a common interest would not be prevented 
from enforcing their rights.14  The modern Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23, which contains the requirements for class actions, was established in 
1966 by amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.15  The 1966 
revision of Rule 23 was intended to offer clarity to the class action device 
and establish various procedural requirements for certification of a class 
action.16  Class action litigation is an exception to the traditional rule of 
individual adjudication and therefore has additional procedural and 
constitutional requirements.17 
Representative litigation is also an exception to the long held maxim that 
one is not bound by a judgment in litigation to which he is not a party.18  A 
similarly situated group, properly represented in a “class” or 
“representative” proceeding, may be bound by a judgment even if not made 
party to the suit.19  Rule 23 allows large groups of individuals to come 
together and adjudicate many individual claims at once.20 
While class actions are a procedural device, experts have noted that class 
treatment necessarily eases plaintiffs’ costs in bringing many types of 
claims.21  For example, small-value claims, which are commonly consumer 
claims, do not individually provide the necessary financial incentives for an 
individual to bring a claim.22  Class action adjudication provides plaintiffs 
with the incentives to prosecute claims that previously would not have been 
pursued.23  By making litigation easier for one party, class actions affect the 
substantive balance between the two parties.24  Because Rule 23 is a 
procedural rule that affects parties’ substantive rights, it has proven quite 
controversial.25  Two traditional policy reasons that have been put forth to 
 
 14. 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1751 (3d 
ed. 2005 & Supp. 2013). 
 15. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See id.; see also Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940). 
 18. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 41.  “It is a principle of general application in Anglo-
American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in 
which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of 
process.” Id. at 40 (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877)). 
 19. Id. 
 20. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 21. See Symposium, Some Reflections on the “Abusiveness” of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 
299, 299–300 (1973) (featuring the Honorable Jack Weinstein and Professors Arthur Miller 
and Geoffrey Hazard and discussing the effects of the modern amendments to Rule 23). 
 22. See Myriam Gilles, Class Dismissed:  Contemporary Judicial Hostility to Small-
Claims Consumer Class Actions, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 305, 305 (2010). 
 23. See id.; Symposium, supra note 21, at 300. 
 24. Symposium, supra note 21, at 300. 
 25. See id. at 301; Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights:  
Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 670 (1979). 
2014] ASCERTAINABILITY IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT 2363 
lend legitimacy to class treatment of individual claims are (1) the negative-
value conception and (2) the regulatory conception.26 
1.  The Negative-Value Conception 
Benjamin Kaplan, a primary drafter of modern Rule 23, believed Rule 23 
would allow for vindication of rights that would otherwise not be 
adjudicated.27  Rule 23 “provide[d] means of vindicating the rights of 
groups of people who individually would be without effective strength to 
bring their opponents into court at all.”28  Kaplan believed that when the 
stakes for each individual class member are large and each individual can 
enforce his rights himself, class treatment is unnecessary.29  According to 
Kaplan, class treatment overcomes a lack of incentive to pursue small 
claims.30 
The U.S. Supreme Court identified this compensatory function of class 
actions in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.31  The Court noted that the lone 
petitioner’s individual stake in the litigation was only worth $70;32 
therefore, “[n]o competent attorney would undertake this complex antitrust 
action to recover so inconsequential an amount.  Economic reality dictates 
that petitioner’s suit proceed as a class action or not at all.”33  For example, 
notice in Eisen was prohibitively expensive.34  The Court, however, while 
recognizing the importance of Rule 23 in litigating negative-value claims, 
did not allow the plaintiffs to pass that cost on to the defendants.35  While 
Rule 23 allows plaintiffs to enforce a substantive right that otherwise would 
have gone uncompensated, plaintiffs must still bear the financial burden 
needed to satisfy Rule 23’s requirements.36   
In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,37 the Supreme Court reiterated this 
view of class actions as a device for overcoming problems presented by 
small recoveries.38  Class actions aggregate many small claims “‘into 
something worth someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.’”39  This aspect 
of Rule 23, identified by the Supreme Court, is precisely what Benjamin 
 
 26. Gilles, supra note 22, at 305 (identifying the negative-value conception of class 
actions); David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I:  Sturm Und Drang, 
1953–1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 592–99 (2013) (identifying the regulatory conception 
of class actions). 
 27. See Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 
(1969). 
 28. Id. 
 29. See Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 
13–14 (1991). 
 30. See id. at 13. 
 31. 417 U.S. 156 (1974). 
 32. Id. at 161. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See id. at 178. 
 35. See id. at 178–79. 
 36. See id. 
 37. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 38. See id. at 617. 
 39. Id. (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (1997)). 
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Kaplan had in mind when drafting Rule 23.40  Aggregation allows for 
compensation where none would have otherwise been practical.41  
2.  The Regulatory Conception:  Private Attorneys General Model 
Groups such as consumer advocates, civil rights practitioners, and 
plaintiffs’ lawyers have identified the use of Rule 23 as a regulatory 
device.42  “The regulatory conception treats Rule 23 as ‘an evolutionary 
response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of 
government.’”43  The conception of Rule 23 as a regulatory device 
stemmed from the understanding that class actions could serve as an 
important substitute to public regulation.44 
If regulation is the primary goal of a class action, individual remediation 
is not essential to support the policy behind Rule 23.45  Although 
compensating class members helps deter defendants’ general unlawful 
conduct, the deterrence itself is the primary purpose, not the class 
compensation.46  The defendant’s general unlawful conduct is most 
important, and courts should attempt class certification to accomplish this 
goal.47 
Legal theorists claim that because of both budgetary issues and concerns 
about capture,48 regulatory agencies are incapable of adequately enforcing 
substantive law.49  Therefore, privately initiated litigation is necessary to 
protect certain substantive rights.50  Although private litigation is an 
important tool to implement many substantive rights, individual claimants 
often do not have the incentives or resources to prosecute claims that 
otherwise would go unlitigated.51  “[W]here harms are small and dispersed, 
the defendants can avoid liability because no individual has sufficient 
incentive to sue.”52  Rule 23 therefore responds to this issue and ensures 
that more substantive law is enforced through private litigation.53 
Private litigation through Rule 23 pushes enforcement of substantive law 
to a more optimal point that regulatory agencies alone would not be able to 
 
 40. Kaplan, supra note 27, at 497. 
 41. 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:7 (5th ed. 2011). 
 42. Gilles, supra note 22, at 309; Alexandra D. Lahav, Two Views of the Class Action, 
79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1939, 1951–53 (2011); Marcus, supra note 26, at 590. 
 43. Marcus, supra note 26, at 592–93 (quoting Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 
U.S. 326, 339 (1980)). 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. at 593. 
 46. See 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 1:8. 
 47. See id. 
 48. Regulatory capture occurs when “interest groups and political decisionmakers enter 
into jointly maximizing relationships.” William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, 
Regulatory Competition, Regulatory Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. 
REV. 1861, 1885 (1995). 
 49. See Marcus, supra note 26, at 593. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. 
 52. 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 1:8. 
 53. See Marcus, supra note 26, at 593. 
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achieve.54  Aggregation of claims now allows “an independent, well-
financed cadre of private attorneys general to compensate for the 
inadequacies of government regulators and individual litigants.”55  These 
private attorneys general can utilize Rule 23 to deter defendants from 
engaging in wrongdoing otherwise left unaddressed.56  Congress often 
legislates with private attorneys general in mind by enacting damage and 
fee provisions that enable private enforcement actions.57  For such 
legislation to succeed in regulating private conduct, the class action device 
must be available.58 
Turning to the legitimacy of Rule 23, supporters of the regulatory model 
would argue that the enforcement of substantive law provides the necessary 
legitimacy to maintain class actions.59  Scholars have noted that private 
suits aid public enforcement of laws and that the class action device is an 
important factor in this enforcement.60  This view is supported by the 
Supreme Court, which specifically identified classwide suits as a response 
to “injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of government.”61  Class 
actions also enhance judicial efficiencyspecifically in cases where 
plaintiffs have large enough claims that they would individually pursue 
those claims.62  While efficiency in small-claims classes may be more 
suspect, these classes generate efficient enforcement of substantive rights.63  
More efficient enforcement of legal norms, along with future deterrence, are 
two important “positive externalities” that contribute to the efficiency of the 
small-claims consumer class action.64 
B.  The Explicit Requirements of Rule 23 
Rule 23, while designed to promote judicial economy, contains a number 
of explicit requirements that must be satisfied in order to maintain a class 
action.65  These requirements are in place to ensure that the rights of absent 
class members are adequately protected, as the representative nature of 
class actions necessarily limits the ordinary individual autonomy 
characteristic of the adversary model.66  The procedural requirements that 
must be satisfied prior to class certification also determine whether 
maintenance of a class action is economically and administratively feasible, 
coherent, and constitutionally permissible.67  Failure to satisfy any of Rule 
 
 54. See id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See, e.g., deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1231 (10th Cir. 1970). 
 57. See 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 1:8. 
 58. See id. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. 
 61. Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980). 
 62. 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 1:9. 
 63. See id. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See id.; 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 1753. 
 66. See 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 1:3. 
 67. See id. 
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23’s requirements will result in a denial of class certification.68  For a class 
action to be certified, all requirements of Rule 23(a) must first be 
satisfied.69  A class action must then fit into one of three categories outlined 
in Rule 23(b).70 
The first requirement, Rule 23(a)(1), known as numerosity, focuses on 
the number of potential class members.71  Numerosity requires that a class 
may be certified only if it is so numerous that joinder is impracticable.72  
Numerosity serves three important purposes:  (1) it reveals the legal 
system’s preference for individual litigation; (2) it works to ensure that Rule 
23 is in fact an efficient way to litigate; and (3) it allows courts to consider 
factors, other than the pure number of litigants, that may indicate that 
joinder, a class action alternative, is impractical.73 
Ultimately, the Rule 23(a)(1) numerosity requirement directs a court to 
determine whether joinder is a better procedural device than a class 
action.74  The lack of a strict threshold to meet numerosity reinforces the 
idea that courts must engage with the facts thoroughly to determine if 
joinder is impractical.75  Class actions often involve a wide range of 
plaintiffs, but the key underlying factor that must be satisfied is that joinder 
is never practical. 
Rule 23(a)(2) requires that common questions of law or fact exist in 
order to certify a class.76  Often referred to as commonality, 23(a)(2) is 
satisfied if a single issue of law or fact exists for all class members.77  The 
common question need not be both one of law and fact, but may be a 
common question of either law or of fact.78  Because of the representative 
nature of class actions, commonality ensures that the advantages of 
representative litigation are actually obtained.79  If a common question does 
not exist, then there is no basis to bind one litigant to the outcome of 
another.80 
The commonality requirements had long been settled until Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.81  In Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court stated, 
“Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members 
‘have suffered the same injury,’. . . .  That common contention, moreover, 
 
 68. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 69. See id. R. 23(a). 
 70. See id. R. 23(b). 
 71. See id. R. 23(a)(1). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 3:11.  An example of the third rationale 
for numerosity would be a situation where the court is not flooded with individual litigants, 
but joinder may be impractical because of the small value of claims. 
 74. See id. § 3:11. 
 75. See id. § 3:12. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. § 3:18. 
 78. Id. § 3:21. 
 79. Id. § 3:18. 
 80. Id. 
 81. 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550–57 (2011). 
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must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution.”82  The 
Court emphasized the importance of the commonality question and pointed 
towards a renewed focus on this prong of class certification.83   
The latter two requirements of Rule 23(a), typicality and adequacy, 
guarantee that the class representative has the proper qualifications to 
represent the class.84  Rule 23(a)(3) requires that the claims or defenses of 
the representative party be typical of the class.85  This requirement ensures 
that the representative is in fact a member of the class.86  Rule 23(a)(3) also 
presumes that a representative whose claim is typical of the class will 
pursue not only his best interests but those of the class as well.87 
Finally, Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the representative parties fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class.88  Adequacy focuses the court’s 
attention on the attributes of the individual seeking to represent a class.89  
Because a class action binds absent class members, a certain level of 
legitimacy is required to validate the binding effect of class adjudication.90  
The Due Process Clause and class action procedure both require that absent 
class members’ interests be adequately protected.91  Rule 23(a)(4) helps 
stymie fears about binding absent parties by requiring that a class 
representative pursue the interests of the class sufficiently such that any 
judgment can fairly bind absent class members.92  Failure to satisfy Rule 
23(a)(4) can reopen a class judgment to future judicial scrutiny.93  Because 
class representatives are often given financial incentives, adequacy helps 
guarantee that class representatives have the best interests of the class in 
mind.94 
If Rule 23(a) is satisfied, a class action must then fit into one of three 
class action types set forth by Rule 23(b).95  Rule 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) are 
mandatory classes that do not allow opt outs and generally do not seek 
money damages.96  This Note focuses on Rule 23(b)(3) class actions—
damages suits—because that is where ascertainability issues generally arise. 
Monetary damages may be sought as a remedy by Rule 23(b)(3) classes, 
distinguishing them from Rule 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) classes.97  Because 
 
 82. Id. at 2551. 
 83. Id. at 2552. 
 84. Id. at 2553. 
 85. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). 
 86. 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 3:28. 
 87. Id. 
 88. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
 89. 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 3:50. 
 90. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43 (1940). 
 91. Id. at 42–43. 
 92. 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 3:50. 
 93. See, e.g., Hansberry, 311 U.S. 32 (stating that a prior class action did not adequately 
represent the current parties and could not bind those parties to the prior judgment).  
Hansberry did not apply the requirements of Rule 23. 
 94. Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 959 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 95. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
 96. Id. R. 23(b)(1)–(2). 
 97. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558 (2011). 
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Rule 23(b)(3) classes seek monetary damages, the procedural requirements 
reflect potential individualized determinations.98  The justification for this 
class is the predominance of a common question of law or fact and a 
determination that the class action is the superior method to fairly and 
efficiently adjudicate the controversy.99  Not only must a common question 
of law or fact exist, thus satisfying Rule 23(a)(1), but a common question of 
law or fact must also predominate over all other issues.100  Rule 23(b)(3) 
lists a number of factors that are intended to guide the court in its 
determination of whether a class action is superior and whether a common 
question predominates.101  Aside from requiring predominance and 
superiority, Rule 23(b)(3) classes differ in a number of other crucial 
aspects.102 
Unlike Rule 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) class actions, class members of a Rule 
23(b)(3) class action may choose to opt out of the class.103  23(b)(3) class 
members must be provided with an opportunity to opt out of the class to 
satisfy constitutional due process concerns.104  Courts must also direct 
notice of the class action to all members who may be identified through 
reasonable efforts.105  While this does not mean that each individual class 
member must receive notice, each class member who may be identified 
through reasonable efforts must in fact receive notice.106  If identification of 
all putative class members at the time of certification proves impractical, 
courts often direct notice through publication or similar means that will 
alert the general public, and therefore presumably potential class members, 
to the existence of a class action.107 
Once a class action is properly certified, any judgment is binding on all 
class members in subsequent litigation under the doctrines of issue and 
claim preclusion.108  Claim preclusion applies if:  (1) the second claim is 
the same claim as the class action claim; (2) the second claim is between the 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. FED R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 1:3; 7A WRIGHT ET 
AL., supra note 14, § 1777. 
 100. FED R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 101. Id.  The matters pertinent to these findings include:   
(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or 
defense of separate actions;  
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already 
begun by or against class members;  
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims 
in the particular forum; and  
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action. 
Id. R. 23(b)(3)(A)–(D). 
 102. See infra notes 103–07 and accompanying text. 
 103. See FED R. CIV. P. 23(c); 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 1777. 
 104. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985). 
 105. FED R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). 
 106. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997). 
 107. Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Mullane 
v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 309–10 (1950). 
 108. Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1984). 
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same parties; and (3) the previous judgment was valid, final, and on the 
merits.109 
C.  The Ascertainability Requirement 
Part I.C discusses the origins of the ascertainability requirement and 
common tests to determine if a class is ascertainable, and then introduces 
the concept of subjective classes. 
1.  The Origins of Ascertainability 
Ascertainability has traditionally been defined as the existence of a class 
whose members can be identified by reference to objective criteria in the 
class definition.110 
Because ascertainability is an implicit element of Rule 23, courts have 
found authority to require it in a number of sources.111  Ascertainability has 
no universally agreed upon textual source.112  Courts therefore often make a 
policy argument for ascertainability’s necessity.113  Those opposed to 
imposing additional hurdles to class certification argue that Rule 23 itself 
contains all of the necessary procedural protections to satisfy all “essential 
issues of class action law.”114  Some courts discuss ascertainability 
generally, but fail to mention any specific statutory language from which 
such a requirement may be implied.115  While not deriving ascertainability 
from specific statutory language, these courts tend to focus on the policy 
reasons for implying a requirement of ascertainability in a class 
 
 109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 17 (1982). 
 110. See Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 668 F.3d 481, 496 (7th Cir. 2012); Steed, 
supra note 8, at 627. 
 111. 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 3:2. 
 112. See id. 
 113. John v. Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 501 F.3d 443, 445 n.3 (5th Cir. 2007); Singer v. 
AT & T Corp., 185 F.R.D. 681, 685 (S.D. Fla. 1998). 
 114. Blain v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 240 F.R.D. 179, 184 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (“Because 
the same considerations in evaluating the sufficiency of the class definition are implicated in 
the commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation analyses, and courts are charged 
with analyzing all of the Rule 23(a) factors anyway, the sufficiency of the class definition 
can be assessed in the context of the Rule 23(a) analysis without engaging in a redundant 
exercise.”). 
 115. See generally Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc., 258 F.R.D. 320, 325 (S.D. 
Ill. 2009) (addressing how a proper class definition aids the court, but not where the 
requirement of a proper class definition comes from); Bakalar v. Vavra, 237 F.R.D. 59, 64–
66 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (providing significant discussion about ensuring that class members be 
ascertainable, but not providing any indication from where such a requirement is derived); 
1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 3:2. 
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definition.116  Courts that do provide a textual source for ascertainability 
have identified three sources for the requirement.117 
The first policy argument is that Rule 23 does not adequately vindicate 
the purposes of class adjudication.118  In John v. National Security Fire and 
Casualty Co., the Fifth Circuit noted that while “the text of Rule 23(a) is 
silent on the matter, a class must not only exist, the class must be 
susceptible of precise definition.”119  Ascertainability therefore demands a 
certain level of precision from a class definition120 that will allow a court to 
determine whether or not class treatment is proper.121  Neither Rule 23(a) 
nor Rule 23(c) actually addresses how a class is properly defined.122  By 
demanding an additional requirement of ascertainability, class definitions 
allow courts to identify both the class and potential class members based on 
objective criteria.123  Courts that accept this purpose for ascertainability will 
then likely apply the doctrine to all types of Rule 23(b) classes.124 
The second policy argument supporting ascertainability results from a 
common issue facing class certification:  proposed classes are often 
indefinite.125  Focusing on ascertainability at an early stage allows courts to 
directly confront problems facing class certification rather than attempting 
to solve the issues using the traditional Rule 23(a) analysis.126  This 
conception of ascertainability forces courts to apply the doctrine to all types 
of Rule 23(b) classes, but courts need only raise the issue if the class 
definition appears to be inadequate.127 
The final policy argument for developing the implicit requirement is 
concern for the due process rights of absent litigants.128  Ascertainability 
deserves special discussion, because without any treatment of it, it “would 
be unconstitutional to bind absent litigants to the results of aggregate 
proceedings.”129  The class definition is critically important, because it 
identifies those who deserve notice, are entitled to relief, and are bound by a 
final judgment.130  Professor Martin Redish identified additional due 
 
 116. See Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593–94 (3d Cir. 2012); 
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circumstances’” (quoting Cunningham Charter Corp., 258 F.R.D. at 325). 
 117. 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 3:2. 
 118. See Grimes v. Rave Motion Pictures Birmingham, LLC, 264 F.R.D. 659, 664 (N.D. 
Ala. 2010); RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 3:1. 
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 121. Cunningham, 258 F.R.D. at 325. 
 122. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–(c). 
 123. Boundas v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 280 F.R.D. 408, 417 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 
 124. See 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 3:1. 
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 127. Id. 
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 130. Singer v. AT & T Corp., 185 F.R.D. 681, 685 (S.D. Fla. 1998). 
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process concerns in relation to a litigant’s individual autonomy to advance 
her claim in the manner she deems most appropriate.131  If ascertainability 
ensures that courts direct proper notice, then putative class members should 
retain more individual autonomy.132  Notice in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action 
allows class members to opt out if they do not believe that class 
adjudication is the most effective or appropriate means of vindicating their 
rights.133  Ascertainability therefore provides additional legitimacy to the 
class action device.134 
Turning to the statutory basis for ascertainability, some courts “imply 
that the term ‘class’ in Rule 23(a) means a definite or ascertainable 
class.”135  These courts reason that absent a definite class, the Rule 23(a) 
prerequisites to certification cannot be applied.136  Courts cannot apply the 
four requirements of Rule 23(a) without identifying the members of a 
class.137 
Finally, some remaining courts find support for ascertainability in Rule 
23(c).138  Rule 23(c)(1)(B) specifies what must be included in a certification 
order, but some courts have read this rule to also include the requirement 
that a class be ascertainable.139  Specifically, Rule 23(c)(1)(B) instructs a 
court to define the class.140  As ascertainability directly relates to class 
definitions, Rule 23(c)(1)(B) seems to, at least indirectly, provide some 
support for ascertainability.141  In addition to Rule 23(c)(1)(B), some courts 
look to Rule 23(c)(2) to provide implicit support for ascertainability.142  
Rule 23(c)(2)(B) specifies that in a Rule 23(b)(3) class, “the court must 
direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the 
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be 
identified through reasonable effort.”143  If ascertainability demands that a 
class definition allow a court to identify potential class members, a court 
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Singer, 185 F.R.D. at 685; see also FED. JUD. CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 
§ 21.222 (4th ed. 2004). 
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 134. See 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 3:1. 
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 136. See DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970). 
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 141. See Benito v. Indymac Mortg. Servs., No. 2:09–CV–001218–PMP–PAL, 2010 WL 
2089297, at *2 (D. Nev. May 21, 2010) (stating that Rule 23(c)(1)(B) requires an order 
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 142. Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc., 258 F.R.D. 320, 325 (S.D. Ill. 2009). 
 143. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). 
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may then properly direct notice.144  Establishing a class definition that is 
sufficiently definite is most important in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action, 
because notice is required in a Rule 23(b)(3) class.145  Finding support for 
ascertainability in Rule 23(c)(2) demands that courts address the doctrine 
only in a Rule 23(b)(3) class.146  Rule 23 does not require that a court direct 
notice for a Rule 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2) class.147  As a result, a precise class 
definition to determine who must receive notice is not much of a concern in 
class actions other than in a Rule 23(b)(3) class.148 
2.  Tests For Ascertainability 
Although ascertainability is an essential prerequisite for the maintenance 
of a class action, no bright-line rules exist to examine whether a class is 
sufficiently ascertainable.149  This determination is a fact-dependent inquiry 
based on the unique circumstances of each case.150  Absent a clear 
definition of ascertainability, courts focus on a number of criteria when 
addressing the doctrine.151 
Courts have developed three linguistic formulations commonly used to 
test for ascertainability.152  The first test asks if the class definition is 
“precise, objective, and presently ascertainable.”153  The second test 
requires that “the class sought to be represented . . . be adequately defined 
and clearly ascertainable.”154  The final test focuses on the presence of 
“objective criteria” in the class definition.155 
Although each test emphasizes various requirements that a class 
definition must fulfill, courts tend to focus on the ability to identify a class 
by objective criteria, because it allows courts to determine whether a class 
is identifiable based on a clearly defined set of characteristics.156  In 
applying this test, courts will typically find that “an identifiable class exists 
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if its members can be ascertained by reference to objective criteria.”157  For 
example, requiring objective criteria in a class definition allows courts to 
dispose of class actions based on the mental state of putative class 
members.158  A number of courts in the 1970s developed ascertainability in 
response to class definitions that required a court to delve into an 
individual’s mental state to determine whether he was a potential class 
member.159 
3.  Subjective Classes 
Courts have been guided by a number of seminal class action cases that 
provide analysis of what constitutes an ascertainable class.160  As early as 
1970, the Fifth Circuit in Debremaecker v. Short, addressed the 
ascertainability of a class of “residents of this State active in the ‘peace 
movement’ who have been harassed and intimidated as well as those who 
fear harassment and intimidation in exercising their First Amendment right 
of free expression in the form of passing out leaflets in furtherance of their 
cause.”161  The court noted that an essential element to maintaining a class 
action is that the class be “adequately defined and clearly ascertainable.”162  
This requirement was not met because the term “peace movement” was not 
adequately defined.163  “Peace movement” could mean any number of 
things, thereby precluding the court from identifying the “movement’s” 
members.164  Thus, the court could not determine class membership.165 
While the class definition in Debremaeker failed because it did not 
adequately define “peace movement,” the definition also failed because it 
included “those who fear harassment.”166  The court found that the chilling 
effect the class representative complained of could not possibly reach all 
Texas residents wishing to voice their opinion on the Vietnam War.167  A 
class definition based on such an effect will typically fail to meet the 
requirement that a class be ascertainable, because a court cannot determine 
members who have been chilled absent individualized findings of fact.168  
The Fifth Circuit’s rationale for denying class certification in 
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Debremaecker was an influential decision that provided guidance to other 
circuits in relation to “mental state” classes.169 
In Simer v. Rios,170 the Seventh Circuit confronted a similar issue of 
“chilling.”  The putative plaintiffs were individuals who qualified for, but 
did not receive, cash assistance for fuel and utilities from the Emergency 
Energy Conservation Program.171  The complaint defined the class as 
“those individuals eligible for [public] assistance but who were denied 
assistance or who were discouraged from applying because of the existence 
of the invalid regulation promulgated by [the Community Services 
Administration, a government agency].”172  To certify a class based on this 
definition, the court would first have to identify those individuals who were 
eligible for assistance.173  The court would then have to engage in the 
“Sisyphean task of identifying those individuals” who not only qualified for 
assistance, but who also knew of the existence of the regulation “and were 
discouraged from applying for assistance because of the shut-off notice 
requirement.”174  Any attempt to identify those individuals who were 
“chilled” would burden the court in terms of both time and money.175 
The court then noted that identification of class members helps courts 
determine whether the class action device is the proper way to try the case 
and ensures that only those harmed by the defendant’s conduct will be the 
recipients of any eventual relief.176  In Simer, the court could not determine 
based on objective criteria whether or not someone harmed by the 
Community Service Administration’s actions should be a member of the 
class.177  The only way to determine the members of the plaintiff’s class 
would have been to engage in individualized findings of fact.178  
Determining which potential class members were in fact discouraged from 
applying for assistance is an individualized determination that, while not an 
absolute bar to class certification, presented an “arduous task for the parties 
as well as the district court.”179 
II.  THE UNACKNOWLEDGED SPLIT  
REGARDING ASCERTAINABILITY 
This Part first explains how courts typically apply the ascertainability 
requirement.  It then discusses the Third Circuit’s new approach. 
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Although most circuits have acknowledged the need for ascertainability, 
few circuit court decisions have addressed the issue directly.180  
Nevertheless, the requirement that a class be ascertainable has long been 
understood by a number of courts as an implicit prerequisite to class 
certification.181  Although ascertainability is necessarily a prerequisite to 
class certification, the exact application of ascertainability is an essential 
question of an increasingly important requirement.182 
A.  The Traditional Ascertainability Approach:  Ascertainability  
Applied As a Definitional Requirement Demanding a  
Precisely Defined Class Based on Objective Terms 
Because few circuits have addressed ascertainability directly, little 
discussion of the issue exists at the circuit level.183  As an implied 
requirement of class certification, however, the issue of ascertainability is 
often raised in district court decisions regarding class certification.184  
Ascertainability ordinarily requires that a court be able to identify 
individual class members without individualized trials.185  If a class 
member can be identified solely by reference to objective criteria in the 
class definition, the class will typically be ascertainable.186  Though 
ascertainability receives only modest discussion at the circuit court level, 
the Seventh Circuit recently addressed the requirement.187  
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In Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., the plaintiff attempted to certify a Rule 
23(b)(3) consumer class action, claiming that Coca-Cola engaged in 
deceptive advertising.188  According to the plaintiff, Coca-Cola led 
consumers to believe that bottled and fountain Diet Coke contained the 
same artificial sweetener.189  Membership in the plaintiff’s proposed class 
only required the purchase of a Diet Coke.190  The Seventh Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s decision denying certification because the class 
definition “was not sufficiently definite.”191  A damages claim under the 
Illinois statute at issue required that the plaintiff was in fact deceived and 
damaged in some way by the deception.192  But membership in Oshana’s 
proposed class did not necessarily require that the plaintiff be deceived.193  
As the Seventh Circuit pointed out, “Some people may have bought 
fountain Diet Coke because it contained saccharin, and some people may 
have bought fountain Diet Coke even though it had saccharin.”194  The 
court further noted, “Countless members of Oshana’s putative class could 
not show any damage, let alone damage proximately caused by Coke’s 
alleged deception.”195  Thus, the class definition would necessarily contain 
some individuals who knew fountain Diet Coke contained saccharin and 
bought it anyway.196   
While the court emphasized that this class definition was not sufficiently 
definite, and therefore failed to satisfy ascertainability, its discussion of 
ascertainability was significantly enmeshed with typicality.197  Inclusion in 
the class was independent of potentially having suffered any harm as 
required by the Illinois statute.198  The proposed class was not identifiable, 
because the class consisted of both harmed and unharmed individuals.199  
Although the class definition itself was based on objective terms, the terms 
did not identify a sufficiently definite class of individuals who may have 
been harmed under the Illinois consumer fraud claim.200  The class 
definition could not allow a court to identify individuals who were harmed 
by Coca-Cola’s actions.201  The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Oshana 
provided important precedent for district courts in applying the 
ascertainability doctrine.202 
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In Boundas v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., a court in the Northern 
District of Illinois certified a Rule 23(b)(3) damages class, rejecting the 
defendant’s argument that the class was not ascertainable.203  The 
underlying facts involved a promotion giving a $25 gift card to any 
Abercrombie consumer who purchased at least $100 worth of 
merchandise.204  The promotional gift cards stated that they were 
redeemable at any Abercrombie store and did not have an expiration 
date.205  Abercrombie failed to maintain any records that would have 
allowed the store to determine who received a gift card.206  When the class 
representative attempted to redeem her gift card, she was told that the card 
expired and had been voided.207  The plaintiff then sued Abercrombie and 
sought certification of a class of: 
All people who received Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. promotional 
gift cards in hard copy stating “no expiration date” issued as part of a 
2009 winter holiday in-store promotion and voided by Abercrombie & 
Fitch Stores, Inc. on or after January 30, 2010 despite having credit 
remaining on the gift cards.208  
Although the class definition was based on objective criteria, Abercrombie 
argued that the class was not ascertainable because with the exception of a 
small number of individuals, class members could not be identified.209 
Abercrombie’s argument failed because the district court determined that 
individual class members’ identities did not need to be identified prior to 
certification.210  The court found that ascertainability was not intended to 
prevent certification because of a lack of records; rather, ascertainability 
ensures that the class definition is sufficiently definite such that a court can 
determine who should be in the class.211  Ascertainability demands that an 
identifiable class exist, such that its members can be identified by reference 
to objective criteria.212  As the court held, the class in Boundas “consist[ed] 
primarily of individuals holding an Abercrombie promotional gift card 
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whose value was voided on or around January 30, 2010.  That criterion is as 
objective as they come.”213  The class also consisted of those who threw 
away their cards.214  While this criterion is not as objective as those who 
retained their gift cards, these class members were required to submit an 
affidavit to be evaluated during a claims administration process if the 
plaintiffs were to prevail at trial.215 
Finally, the court addressed how ascertainability impacts class notice.216  
Abercrombie claimed that without identification of individual absent class 
members, “notice by mail [could not] be effectuated.”217  Although 
Abercrombie was correct in determining that notice by mail would be 
nearly impossible, the Seventh Circuit’s doctrine does not require that 
notice by mail be practical as a prerequisite to class certification.218  Notice 
by publication would have been a sufficient substitute for notice by mail in 
light of the circumstances.219  The facts of Boundas are quite similar to 
other consumer class actions that have been dismissed on the basis of a lack 
of records identifying potential class members.220 
Astiana v. Kashi Co.221 is a consumer class action that presented the 
court with similar questions regarding class member identification.222  In 
Astiana, the representative plaintiffs brought a consumer class action 
against Kashi Brands for allegedly deceptive advertising.223  The Southern 
District of California certified a Rule 23(b)(3) class consisting of:  “All 
California residents who purchased Kashi Company’s food products on or 
after August 24, 2007 in the State of California that were labeled ‘Nothing 
Artificial.’”224  Kashi sold foods labeled as “all natural” or “nothing 
artificial,” but the plaintiffs claimed that foods with this label actually 
contained many artificial ingredients.225 
Attempting to defeat certification, Kashi argued that the class could not 
be certified because of the administrative difficulties involved in identifying 
class members.226  Kashi claimed that because potential class members 
likely do not have records or evidence of their purchases, “the Court will 
have no feasible mechanism for identifying class members and will have to 
pursue proof individual to each class member.”227 
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 217. Id. 
 218. Id. (citing Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 2004)). 
 219. Id. 
 220. See, e.g., Weiner v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07 Civ. 8742(DLC), 2010 WL 
3119452, at *12–13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2010). 
 221. 291 F.R.D. 493 (S.D. Cal. 2013). 
 222. Id. at 500. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 510. 
 225. Id. at 498. 
 226. Id. at 500. 
 227. Id. 
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The court disagreed with Kashi that the potential administrative burden 
of identifying class members resulted in a failure to satisfy 
ascertainability.228  The class definition at issue was in fact “adequately 
defined and clearly ascertainable,”229 nor did it present any administrative 
burdens that would prevent certification.230  The proposed class definition 
properly identified purchasers of the defendant’s products that contained the 
alleged misrepresentation.231  Notably, the court stated that because the 
alleged misrepresentation was on the package of the products, there is no 
concern that the class could include individuals not exposed to the 
misrepresentation.232  According to the district court, allowing class actions 
to be defeated at such an early stage due to difficulties in ascertaining 
membership would essentially prohibit any consumer class actions.233  As 
the court found, the definition need only be sufficiently definite to identify 
putative class members, and challenges entailed in administration of this 
class are not so burdensome to defeat class certification.234 
B.  The Third Circuit’s Heightened Approach  
to Ascertainability 
The Third Circuit diverges from the other circuit courts.235  Whereas 
other courts hold a class ascertainable when class members are identifiable 
 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. Compare Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 513–14 (7th Cir. 2006), with 
Astiana, 291 F.R.D. 493.  In Oshana, the alleged misrepresentation was not included on any 
package, so some people who bought the product may very likely not have been misled. See 
Oshana, 472 F.3d at 514.  In Astiana, however, the package itself featured deceptive 
advertising. Astiana, 291 F.R.D. at 500.  In Oshana, some people may have bought fountain 
soda, because it in fact contained the artificial sweetener, and therefore those individuals 
were not deceived. Oshana, 472 F.3d at 514. 
 233. See Astiana, 291 F.R.D. at 500. 
 234. Id. 
 235. While the Third Circuit is the first circuit court to accept this approach to 
ascertainability, other district courts have used ascertainability to deny certification in small-
claims consumer class actions.  In Weiner v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07 CIV. 
8742(DLC), 2010 WL 3119452 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2010), the plaintiffs alleged that Snapple 
violated consumer protection laws by labeling certain products as “all natural” even though 
the products contained high fructose corn syrup. Id. at *1.  The class definition included all 
persons who within the state of New York purchased a Snapple beverage labeled “all 
natural” between 2001 and 2009. Id. at *2.  The court denied certification, because 
predominance was not satisfied, but the court also noted that the class definition would likely 
fail ascertainability. Id. at *5–6, *12–13.  To be ascertainable, the court must be able to 
identify class members based on objective criteria that are administratively feasible. Id. at 
*12.  The plaintiffs argued that the court could require class members to submit a receipt, 
bottle label, or sign a declaration confirming the purchase of a Snapple labeled “all natural.” 
Id. at *13.  As to the first two suggestions, the plaintiffs showed no evidence that consumers 
retained a label or receipt. Id.  Declarations would not adequately identify class members, 
because putative class members “[were] unlikely to remember accurately every Snapple 
purchase during the class period . . . .” Id.  Soliciting declarations would invite putative class 
members to speculate about their Snapple purchases. Id.  In a case involving a similar set of 
facts, plaintiffs alleged that Chipotle engaged in deceptive advertising by claiming that they 
only served “naturally raised” meats. Hernandez v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., No. CV 12-
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based on objective criteria in the class definition, the Third Circuit further 
requires that plaintiffs prove that an administratively feasible mechanism 
for identifying class members exists.236  This rule was created through three 
recent cases. 
The first of the three was Marcus v. BMW of North America, LLC.237  In 
Marcus, the named plaintiff sought to certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class “on 
behalf of all purchasers and lessees of certain model-year BMWs equipped 
with Bridgestone [run-flat tires (RFTs)] sold or leased in New Jersey with 
tires that ‘have gone flat and been replaced.’”238  Marcus brought this class 
action as a result of what he believed to be defective RFTs that came 
equipped on his BMW 3 Series convertible.239  Marcus brought his claim 
against BMW of North America, Bridgestone Tire, and a number of 
Bridgestone subsidiaries.240  The initial complaint asserted claims of 
consumer fraud, breach of warranty, and breach of contract claims.241  
During his three-year lease, Marcus suffered four flat tires, costing between 
$350 and $390 to replace each tire.242 
Marcus initially attempted to certify both a nationwide class of 3 Series 
owners and lessees and a New Jersey subclass against BMW and 
Bridgestone.243  The district court denied certification of a nationwide class, 
but granted certification with respect to the New Jersey subclass.244  Before 
the Third Circuit considered whether the certified class satisfied the 
requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b), the court addressed ascertainability:  
“(1) whether the District Court clearly defined the parameters of the class 
and the claims to be given class treatment, as required by Rule 23(c)(1)(B); 
 
5543 DSF(JCx), 2013 WL 6332002 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2013).  The judge denied class 
certification, because the proposed class action failed Rule 23(b)(3). Id. at *1.  Identifying 
that common issues did not predominate over individual ones, the judge also alluded to a 
failure to satisfy ascertainability. See id.  Chipotle’s misconduct took place only at certain 
locations within a specific time frame. Id.  Plaintiffs would have to know with specificity 
exactly where, when, and what meats they purchased to be included in the class definition. 
Id.  “In other cases, the class will be all purchasers of a particular product within some 
reasonably large time period, so the details of the purchase are not significant.” Id.  Credit 
card records could potentially identify Chipotle transactions but would not identify the 
specific type of meat purchased. Id.  Thus, credit card records would only lead to more 
individualized inquiries to determine exactly what type of meat was being served at the 
specific location on the date of the transaction. See id.  Although these two cases denied 
class certification in part because of ascertainability, these cases are distinguishable from the 
recent Third Circuit cases.  In both of these cases, plaintiffs would be unable to identify 
themselves as class members.  Because of the type of claim, plaintiffs could not simply say 
that they purchased a specific product and are therefore included in the class definition.  
Hernandez specifically illustrates this point.  While putative class members may have been 
able to say that they ate at Chipotle on a specific date, this determination would not 
necessarily result in inclusion in the class. 
 236. See infra notes 286–88 and accompanying text. 
 237. 687 F.3d 583 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 238. Id. at 588. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 590. 
 244. Id. 
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and (2) whether the class must be (and, if so, is in fact) objectively 
ascertainable.”245 
On appeal, the Marcus court began its discussion of ascertainability by 
noting that “[m]any courts and commentators have recognized that an 
essential prerequisite of a class action, at least with respect to actions under 
Rule 23(b)(3), is that the class must be currently and readily ascertainable 
based on objective criteria.”246  The Third Circuit therefore appears to be in 
line with a majority of courts, emphasizing objective criteria in the class 
definition as the essential element in determining the ascertainability of a 
potential class.247  Although the court claimed that a “class must be 
currently and readily ascertainable based on objective criteria,”248 it also 
held that “[i]f class members are impossible to identify without extensive 
and individualized fact-finding or ‘mini-trials,’ then a class action is 
inappropriate.”249  Individualized factfinding or mini-trials would challenge 
the efficiency realized through class actions.250 
Rather than solely relying on textual support for ascertainability, the 
Third Circuit identified a number of policy and textual sources for requiring 
the doctrine.251  First, requiring that all potential class members are 
ascertainable eliminates any serious administrative burdens that may result 
from an indefinite class and ensures that the efficiency benefits of a class 
action are realized.252  Second, ascertainability “protects absent class 
members by facilitating the ‘best notice practicable’ under Rule 23(c)(2) in 
a Rule 23(b)(3) action.”253  Finally, ascertainability serves to protect 
defendants and ensure that all class members bound by any final judgment 
are clearly identifiable.254  By precisely identifying what ascertainability 
meant and required, the court provided a framework for applying the 
doctrine to class certification decisions.255 
Turning to the specific issues of ascertainability at hand, the court took 
note of a number of problems in objectively identifying class members.256  
 
 245. Id. at 591.  Because the court discusses ascertainability and Rule 23(c)(1)(B) 
separately, the court does not seem to find its justification for applying ascertainability in 
Rule 23(c)(1)(B) as a number of courts do. 
 246. Id. at 592–93 (citing John v. Nat. Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 501 F.3d 443, 445 (5th Cir. 
2007)). 
 247. See id.  As noted earlier, whether or not a class definition is based on objective terms 
is the question most courts focus on when considering the issue of ascertainability. See 
1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, § 3:1. 
 248. Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593. 
 249. Id. 
 250. See id. 
 251. See id. 
 252. Id. (citing Sanneman v. Chrysler Corp., 191 F.R.D. 441, 446 (E.D. Pa. 2000)).  
Eliminating serious administrative burdens seems like a policy goal of Rule 23(c)(1)(B)’s 
requirement that the class definition be precise.  Given that the court discusses this 
requirement separately, this policy benefit seems to fit more appropriately elsewhere. 
 253. Id. (citing FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 132, § 21.222). 
 254. Id. (citing Xavier v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 
2011)). 
 255. See id. at 593–94. 
 256. Id. 
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“BMW claims that it ‘may be able to identify current and former original 
owners and lessees of BMW vehicles factory-equipped with Bridgestone 
RFTS which were initially purchased or leased from New Jersey 
dealership.’”257  While BMW may have been able to identify lessees of 
BMW’s factory equipped with Bridgestone RFTs, BMW counsel suggested 
that BMW would not know exactly which vehicles fit the class definition, 
because they did not maintain a parts manifest and would be unable to 
identify which vehicles that satisfied the class definition actually had 
Bridgestone RFTs.258  Additionally, some cars that arrived at a dealership 
with Bridgestone RFTs may have left with different tires.259  BMW argued 
that even if it could identify all cars with the proper tires, its “records would 
not indicate whether all potential class members’ Bridgestone RFTs ‘have 
gone flat and been replaced,’ as the class definition requires, because the 
class is not limited to those persons who took their vehicles to BMW 
dealers to have their tires replaced.”260  The court’s decision to reverse the 
class certification order, while focusing generally on ascertainably, was 
specifically concerned with the ability of defendant’s records to ascertain 
potential class members.261 
The court noted that if Marcus attempted to certify a class on remand, the 
district court would need to “resolve the critical issue of whether the 
defendants’ records can ascertain class members and, if not, whether there 
is a reliable, administratively feasible alternative.”262  Any method 
involving self-identification of class members would likely fail the court’s 
requirement that class members be objectively ascertainable.263  Focusing 
on ascertainability, the court in Marcus seemed to not only address whether 
class members were objectively ascertainable, but whether potential class 
members were identifiable based on the defendant’s records.264  Extensive 
discussion of ascertainability in Marcus provided the Third Circuit with 
important precedent regarding how ascertainability must be applied in 
future Rule 23(b)(3) classes.265 
Approximately one year later, the Third Circuit revisited the 
ascertainability question with respect to a Rule 23(b)(3) class action.266  In 
Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the Third Circuit vacated the district court’s 
certification order and remanded in light of the Marcus decision.267  At 
 
 257. Id. at 593. 
 258. Id. (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Marcus, 687 F.3d 583 (Nos. 11-1192, 
11-1193)). 
 259. Id. at 593.  BMW claimed that some dealers would change the tires on a car at the 
customers’ request. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. See id. at 592–94. 
 262. Id. at 594. 
 263. Id.  A claims process utilizing sworn affidavits would likely fail, as this would 
“amount to no more than ascertaining by potential class members’ say so.” Id. 
 264. See id. at 592–94. 
 265. See, e.g., Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2013); Hayes v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 351–52 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 266. Hayes, 725 F.3d 349. 
 267. Id. at 352. 
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issue in Hayes was the sale of extended warranties on “as-is” sale items.268  
Sam’s Club contracted with National Electronics Warranty Corporation 
(NEW) to provide extended warranties called “service plans” for a variety 
of items sold in Sam’s Club stores.269  Although Sam’s Club 
indiscriminately sold the warranties, the service plans stated that NEW 
“will not cover ‘products sold ‘as-is’ including but not limited to floor 
models (unless covered by a full manufacturer’s warranty on your date of 
purchase) and demonstration models.’”270  Sam’s Club employees sold 
warranties on goods expressly excluded from coverage by the terms of the 
service plan.271 
When a customer wished to purchase an as-is item, a cashier would scan 
the item.272  After the cashier scanned the item, the original price appeared, 
at which point a cashier performed a “price override” and manually entered 
the sale price.273  Although Sam’s Club software recorded price overrides, 
the software did not record a reason for the override itself.274  Further, the 
court highlighted that price overrides may occur for reasons other than the 
sale of as-is items.275  Each individual Sam’s Club kept a handwritten log of 
all items offered “as-is,” but the log did not record any actual transactions 
involving sales of those items.276 
After the plaintiff learned that the service plan sold to him by a Sam’s 
Club employee was not valid on as-is items, he filed suit in the District of 
New Jersey.277  The district court then certified a class of “[a]ll consumers 
who, from January 26, 2004 to the present, purchased from Sam’s Clubs in 
the State of New Jersey, a Sam’s Club Service Plan to cover as-is 
products.”278  The district court found that this class definition satisfied all 
of the prerequisites for certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class.279  Of note, the 
trial court “found the class was ascertainable because members could be 
determined with reference to objective criteria.”280 
Although ascertainability was only one basis for overruling the class 
certification order, the Third Circuit once again devoted extensive 
discussion to what ascertainability demands.281  On appeal, Wal-Mart 
claimed that the trial court did not consider how the class might practically 
 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. at 353. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. at 354–56.  Once again providing extensive discussion on the issue of 
ascertainability, the court referenced the Marcus decision and the Third Circuit’s extensive 
discussion of ascertainability, in that order, overruling class certification. Id. at 355. 
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be ascertained.282  Wal-Mart argued that individual mini-trials would be 
required to determine who was actually a member of the class.283  
 Addressing the purpose for the ascertainability requirement, the Third 
Circuit found that ascertainability “focuses on whether individuals fitting 
the class definition may be identified without resort to mini-trials.”284  
Referencing the Marcus decision, the court identified two important 
elements of ascertainability that the Marcus court highlighted.285  “Marcus 
made clear that ascertainability entails two important elements.  First, the 
class must be defined with reference to objective criteria.  Second, there 
must be a reliable and administratively feasible mechanism for determining 
whether putative class members fall within the class definition.”286  
Although most courts recognize that a class must be defined with reference 
to objective criteria, the need for an “administratively feasible mechanism” 
to determine if class members fall within the definition is not a typical 
requirement of ascertainability.287  According to the Third Circuit, an 
administratively feasible mechanism can best be described as allowing a 
potential class member to prove his membership through some form of 
proof of purchase or other evidence, and then permitting a defendant to 
challenge such evidence.288 
As an essential prerequisite to class certification, the plaintiff is required 
to show by a preponderance of the evidence that individual mini-trials are 
unnecessary to ascertain identities of class members.289  Ascertainability, 
like the other requirements for class certification, is an evidentiary standard 
that the plaintiff must satisfy prior to a grant of class certification.290  To 
satisfy this standard, a plaintiff would likely have to show that a class 
definition is based on objective terms, and present the court with a plan 
detailing an administratively feasible mechanism which would allow the 
court to determine if putative class members actually fall within the 
class.291  The ascertainability of a potential class cannot just be pled, but 
must in fact be proven by the plaintiff.292 
Because the trial court did not have the benefit of the Marcus decision, 
the court failed to consider whether an administratively feasible mechanism 
 
 282. Id. at 354.  Specifically, Wal-Mart raised “whether it is administratively feasible to 
ascertain the class.” Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. (citing Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012)). 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 355 (citing Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593–94). 
 287. Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 668 F.3d 481, 496 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that 
identification of unidentified children with learning disabilities cannot simply be 
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248 F.R.D. 389, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2008))). 
 288. See Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 289. See Hayes, 725 F.3d at 354–55. 
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 291. See id. at 355. 
 292. Id. at 354–55. 
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existed to determine who exactly should be in the class.293  Although the 
plaintiff failed to identify any such mechanism, the trial court found that the 
plaintiff should not be barred from bringing a class action solely because 
the defendant lacked certain records.294  But the extent to which a defendant 
maintains its records has no impact on the plaintiff’s burden to fulfill all 
necessary requirements of Rule 23.295  Rule 23’s implied requirement of 
ascertainability could not be relaxed solely because Wal-Mart’s records 
may have been inadequate.296  To be successful on remand, the Third 
Circuit stated that the plaintiff would need to “show by a preponderance of 
the evidence that there is a reliable and administratively feasible method for 
ascertaining the class.”297 
After Hayes, the Third Circuit again addressed the implication of 
ascertainability on a Rule 23(b)(3) class certification in Carrera v. Bayer 
Corp.298  In that case, the named plaintiff brought a Rule 23(b)(3) consumer 
class action against Bayer Corp. over allegedly deceptive advertising of its 
“One-A-Day WeightSmart” supplement.299  The supplement was sold in 
retail stores until January 2007, although Bayer never sold the product 
directly to consumers.300 
In the District of New Jersey,301 Carrera “moved to certify a Rule 
23(b)(3) class of Florida consumers under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair 
Trade Practices Act.”302  The class was certified “as all persons who 
purchased WeightSmart in Florida.”303  Bayer challenged the certification 
order, claiming that class members were not ascertainable because of the 
absence of retailer records indicating who ultimately purchased 
WeightSmart.304  The court noted that class members were unlikely to have 
retained documentary evidence of their purchases, and Bayer did not have a 
list of purchasers, as it did not sell the product directly to consumers.305  
The trial court considered Bayer’s objections to class certification based on 
a failure to satisfy ascertainability but “characterized the issue of 
ascertainability as one of manageability, stating ‘speculative problems with 
 
 293. Id. at 355.  The trial court, in discussing numerosity, noted “that Sam’s Club had no 
method for determining how many of the 3,500 price-override transactions that took place 
during the class period were for as-is items.” Id. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. at 356. 
 296. Id. 
 297. See id. 
 298. 727 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2013).  The appellee has since filed a motion for a rehearing 
en banc. Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, Carrera, 727 F.3d 300 
(No. 12-2621). 
 299. Carrera, 727 F.3d at 304. 
 300. Id. 
 301. The plaintiff brought suit in New Jersey court rather than Florida because Bayer is 
headquartered in New Jersey. Id. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. at 305. 
 305. See id. at 304–05. 
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case management’ are insufficient to prevent class certification.”306  Bayer 
then appealed the certification order, challenging the ascertainability of the 
class.307 
Recognizing potential issues in ascertaining the class, Carrera attempted 
to devise two administratively feasible mechanisms to determine who was 
in the class.308  The first method was to utilize retailer records of online 
purchases and sales made with store loyalty or rewards cards.309  The 
second proposed method to ascertain the class was for potential class 
members to submit affidavits declaring that they purchased WeightSmart 
and the amount they purchased.310  Carrera argued that affidavits would 
satisfy ascertainability, because 
[f]irst, due to the low value of the claims, class members will be unlikely 
to submit fraudulent affidavits.  Second, because Bayer’s total liability 
will not depend on the reliability of the affidavits, the ascertainability 
requirement should be relaxed.  Finally, a screening method such as the 
one described in the Prutsman Declaration will ensure any unreliable 
affidavits are identified and disregarded.311 
The plaintiff’s first argument for using affidavits failed, because the 
value of the claims had no bearing on the purpose for requiring that a class 
be ascertainable.312  The court noted that a “core concern” for requiring that 
a class be objectively ascertainable is to allow a defendant to challenge 
class membership.313  Just because claims are low value—minimizing 
concern that individuals will submit fraudulent claims—this does not affect 
a defendant’s ability to challenge class membership.314 
The second argument supporting the use of affidavits to prove the class 
was in fact ascertainable failed because, according to the court, the plaintiff 
once again did not properly understand the interests which ascertainability 
is intended to protect.315  In arguing the merits of an affidavit system, the 
plaintiff noted that liability does not depend on the number of affidavits 
submitted.316  Unlike Marcus, where the number of affidavits submitted 
affected the defendant’s overall liability, liability here would be determined 
at trial, and the number of affidavits submitted would therefore only impact 
an individual class member’s recovery.317  The court observed, however, 
 
 306. Id. (citing Carrera v. Bayer Corp., Civ. A. No. 08-4716, 2011 WL 5878376, at *4 
(D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2011)). 
 307. Id. at 304. 
 308. Id. at 308. 
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 311. Id. at 309.  The plaintiff’s third argument supporting ascertainability was denied by 
the court because the Prutsman Declaration did not show how the affidavits would be 
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the ascertainability requirement. Id. at 311–12. 
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 315. See id. at 309–10. 
 316. Id. at 310. 
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that this method for ascertaining the class would dilute true class members’ 
recovery if damages were paid to fraudulent claims, and therefore would 
fail to adequately protect the interests of absent class members.318  Failing 
to adequately protect absent class members’ interests could allow class 
members to argue that the named plaintiff did not adequately represent 
them, leaving Bayer open to future suits.319  Because ascertainability 
ensures that a feasible method of identifying class members exists, 
fraudulent claims will not be filed and class recovery will not be diluted by 
such claims.320  In the Third Circuit’s view, this interpretation of 
ascertainability ultimately works to protect absent class members’ 
interests.321 
The Third Circuit once again identified that when addressing whether a 
class is ascertainable, “a plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the class is ‘currently and readily ascertainable based on 
objective criteria,’ and a trial court must undertake a rigorous analysis of 
the evidence to determine if the standard is met.”322  Carrera could not 
simply plead that an administratively feasible mechanism for identifying 
class members existed; rather, he had to show that such a method existed.323 
The ascertainability question in Carrera was whether each class member 
actually purchased WeightSmart in Florida.324  Although class actions 
aggregate many individual claims, a defendant still has a due process right 
to challenge each claim, and class certification does not preclude this 
right.325  Due process rights are not limited to challenging the claim itself, 
but extend to the proof used to demonstrate class membership.326  
Therefore, ascertainability protects a defendant’s due process rights by 
“requiring that a defendant be able to test the reliability of the evidence 
submitted to prove class membership.”327 
The court found that for Carrera to satisfy the requirement that the class 
be ascertainable, he had to demonstrate an administratively feasible and 
reliable method for ascertaining class members, which would also permit a 
defendant to challenge the evidence utilized to prove such membership.328  
Carrera failed to establish facts proving that the conditions needed to satisfy 
ascertainability were met, and the Third Circuit therefore overruled the 
district court and denied class certification.329 
 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id.  “When class members are not adequately represented by the named plaintiff, 
they are not bound by the judgment.” Id. (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940)). 
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 323. See id. at 307. 
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2388 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
III.  THE POLICY ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE TWO DIFFERENT  
APPLICATIONS OF ASCERTAINABILITY 
This Part examines the policy arguments for the two distinct approaches 
to ascertainability.  Part III.A discusses various policy reasons for applying 
the traditional approach to ascertainability.  Part III.B identifies and 
examines arguments supporting the Third Circuit’s approach. 
A.  The Policy Reasons for the Traditional Approach  
to Ascertainability 
In light of a traditionally liberal interpretation of Rule 23, individual class 
members need not be identifiable at the class certification stage.330  Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 1 states that the Rules of Civil Procedure “should 
be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding.”331  In Eisen v. Carlisle & 
Jacquelin,332 the Second Circuit held that Rule 23 should be given a liberal 
rather than restrictive interpretation.333  Ascertainability, in the traditional 
sense, demands that a class definition be precise and based on objective 
terms.334  Prior to class certification, only “membership of the class must be 
ascertainable.”335 
Courts that discuss ascertainability ordinarily invoke the doctrine when 
evaluating a class definition.336  Ascertainability is an important implied 
requirement of class certification because it guarantees that an identifiable 
class in fact exists.337  If an identifiable class does not exist, then there is no 
entity that can satisfy the requirements of Rule 23.338  Because Rule 23 
applies to absent parties, an ascertainable class is one that exists and can 
fulfill Rule 23’s requirements.339  The existence of a class is a question of 
fact to be determined based on the circumstances.340  A precise definition 
based on objective terms allows a judge to make such a determination 
regarding the existence of a class.341  The traditional definition of 
ascertainability successfully identifies whether or not a class in fact 
exists.342 
 
 330. 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 1760; see also FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 132, 
§ 21.222, at 270 (“Although the identity of individual class members need not be ascertained 
before class certification, the membership of the class must be ascertainable.”). 
 331. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 332. 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), aff’d, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra 
note 14, § 1754. 
 333. Eisen, 391 F.2d at 563. 
 334. Steed, supra note 8, at 627. 
 335. FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 132, § 21.222. 
 336. See Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 669 (7th Cir. 1981); DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 
F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970). 
 337. See Steed, supra note 8, at 627. 
 338. Id. 
 339. See generally id. 
 340. 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 1760. 
 341. Cf. FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 132, § 21.222. 
 342. DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970). 
2014] ASCERTAINABILITY IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT 2389 
Applying the conventional definition of ascertainability allows courts to 
identify class members, because objective terms in the class definition 
either include or exclude someone as a class member.343  Absent such a 
class definition, a court would have to undergo individualized findings of 
fact to establish who could be a class member—therefore undoing the 
efficiency that class actions are intended to create.344  An important aspect 
of ascertainability is that any class definition also be administratively 
feasible.345  Any class definition must be “sufficiently definite so that it is 
administratively feasible for the court to determine whether a particular 
individual is a member.”346  Emphasizing that class definitions be based on 
objective terms satisfies this requirement, because courts can determine 
membership without delving into the merits of the claims themselves.347  
Courts need only look at the class definition and a putative class member’s 
conduct or actions to determine whether he fits within the class 
definition.348 
Rule 23 is a complex rule of procedure that contains a variety of 
requirements relating to various stages of the class action process.349  Rule 
23(b)(3) importantly specifies determinations that a court must make in 
concluding whether class treatment is appropriate.350  If common issues of 
law or fact do not predominate over individual ones, or if a class action is 
not superior to other available methods for fairly adjudicating the 
controversy, a court may not certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class.351  While 
concerns about the ability to identify absent class members may be raised 
when addressing a class definition, demanding that a class be ascertainable 
is sufficiently distinct from “the notion that individual class members must 
be identifiable at the class certification stage.”352  Once a class is identified, 
a court can decide whether or not a class action is an efficient means of 
adjudication.353  Manageability is explicitly listed as a factor courts should 
consider when determining if a class action is superior to other methods of 
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adjudication.354  If a court finds that absent class members cannot readily be 
identified, a court can deny class certification on manageability grounds.355 
B.  The Policy Arguments Supporting the  
Third Circuit Approach 
In Carrera v. Bayer Corp.,356 the Third Circuit identified three distinct 
policy reasons for applying a more rigorous application of ascertainability 
prior to class certification.357  First, “ascertainability and a clear class 
definition allow potential class members to identify themselves for purposes 
of opting out of a class.”358  Unlike Rule 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) class 
actions, Rule 23(b)(3) class members have an absolute right to opt out.359  
Failure to exercise an opt-out right will bind a putative Rule 23(b)(3) class 
member to any future judgment.360  The right to opt out is an essential 
characteristic of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action because it allows individuals to 
pursue their own claims if they desire to do so.361  Opt-out rights balance 
the benefits gained through class action litigation along with the right to 
individually litigate a claim.362  The ability to opt out satisfies constitutional 
concerns about representative litigation.363 
Because Rule 23(b)(3) classes primarily seek monetary damages, opt-out 
rights allow those individuals with stronger claims to opt out and litigate—
or not litigate—on their own.364  As compared to a class seeking injunctive 
relief, class members’ interests in a damages class are less likely to be 
aligned.365  Exclusion rights are essential for putative damage class 
members who desire to individually litigate their claims.366 
While Rule 23 does not directly protect class members’ opt-out rights, it 
does so indirectly through the notice provision.367  Notice, which must be 
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provided in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action, must inform class members of 
their right to opt out of the class action.368  Absent class members may not 
be afforded their right to opt out if notice is not received.369  Ultimately, the 
Third Circuit’s approach to ascertainability would ensure that all putative 
class members have an opportunity to opt out of class treatment.370  
Demanding that the plaintiff submit an administratively feasible method to 
determine the identity of each class member would allow potential class 
members to receive notice, thus guaranteeing that opt out rights can be 
exercised if desired.371  Because class actions are an exception to the 
traditional rule that nonparties are not bound by the judgment, opt-out rights 
are an essential protection of due process.372  If the Third Circuit’s 
interpretation of ascertainability better directs notice, due process concerns 
of class adjudication should be minimized.373 
Focusing on absent class members, the Third Circuit’s definition of 
ascertainability importantly protects any absent plaintiff’s right to fully 
recover damages that may be awarded.374  Because this view of 
ascertainability demands that all potential class members be identifiable by 
an administratively feasible method, only individuals who are truly class 
members will ultimately be able to recover any damages.375  Absent class 
members need not fear that their recovery will be diminished by fraudulent 
claims.376  Class actions create due process concerns regarding class 
members’ rights, but Rule 23 also may deprive a defendant of his due 
process rights.377 
The second policy reason for a more exacting application of the 
ascertainability doctrine is that it protects a defendant’s due process rights 
once a class action is certified.378  A defendant’s due process right to 
challenge the proof used to establish class membership is not diminished 
solely because litigation proceeds as a class action.379  The Third Circuit’s 
ascertainability test supports due process because it allows a defendant to 
reliably examine evidence used to prove class membership.380  Affidavits 
alone are not sufficient to prove class membership, because a defendant 
would be required to accept as true affidavits of absent class members.381  
A defendant would not be afforded an opportunity to individually challenge 
all claims of absent class members if affidavits are an acceptable alternative 
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to proving class membership.382  Ascertainability identifies all true class 
members, prevents fraudulent claims, and ensures that class members are 
adequately represented.383  If a defendant is ultimately forced to pay out 
fraudulent claims, absent class members could argue that they were not 
adequately represented and therefore not bound by the judgment.384 
Scholars often justify representative litigation because of the efficiency 
associated with litigating many individual claims at once.385  Yet if class 
actions require an administratively burdensome process to determine who 
should be in the class, much of the desired efficiency will be lost.386  The 
Third Circuit claims that its theory of ascertainability demands efficiency, 
and thus addresses one of the important policy goals of a class action.387  
Because the Third Circuit requires a plaintiff to “demonstrate his purported 
method for ascertaining class members is reliable and administratively 
feasible,”388 a burdensome administrative process is no longer necessary to 
determine class membership.389  Courts will easily be able to determine 
those truly entitled to class membership while conserving precious judicial 
resources.390 
Lastly, while plaintiffs and society generally may benefit from the pursuit 
of small-value claims, lawyers have benefited enormously from this 
representative litigation.391  The aggregation of many small claims into a 
single suit often results in large settlements, from which attorneys are paid a 
rewarding fee for their work.392  For example, between 2005 and 2007, 
there have been roughly 100 securities class action settlements in federal 
court each year.393  The settlements have involved between $7 billion and 
$17 billion per year, of which a mean and median of 20 to 30 percent can be 
attributed to attorney’s fees.394  Judges may fear that plaintiffs’ attorneys 
conjure up class actions as a means of seeking compensation.395  The plain 
text of Rule 23(b)(3) is also quite advantageous to plaintiffs and 
significantly eases plaintiffs’ ability to bring suit.396  Interpreting Rule 
23(b)(3) class actions as an attorney-driven piece of litigation tends to cast 
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doubt on the appropriateness of class actions.397  In the same manner that it 
would limit overinclusive classes, the Third Circuit’s heightened approach 
to ascertainability could curb this attorney-driven litigation. 
IV.  COURTS SHOULD APPLY ASCERTAINABILITY SO AS NOT TO  
DESTROY CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS 
Ascertainability, as traditionally applied, ensures that class damages can 
be distributed to those actually harmed398 and that class members are 
precluded from relitigating a valid final judgment.399  Relying on objective 
terms in the class definition to identify putative class members should 
guarantee that these two purposes of ascertainability are realized.  The 
modern amendments to Rule 23 provided plaintiffs with a procedurally 
efficient and cost-effective means of adjudicating many claims.400  Rule 
23(b)(3) drastically changed the landscape of representative litigation and 
created a strong bias in favor of plaintiffs.401   
Ascertainability as applied by the Third Circuit presents a potent tool for 
defendants to defeat many if not all small-claims consumer class actions.402  
Any proposed class action where potential class members do not have 
individual records proving membership in the class and defendants also 
have not maintained records indicating class membership will fail 
ascertainability according to the Third Circuit.403  Many negative-value 
suits fall into this category, because few consumers keep receipts of boxes 
of cereal they consumed or weight loss supplements they purchased.  The 
Third Circuit’s understanding of ascertainability, while attempting to 
prevent many frivolous class actions, goes too far in establishing a bar to 
class certification.  The ascertainability doctrine as described in Carrera 
prohibits a type of representative litigation that, for over forty years, has 
become an accepted—albeit controversial—piece of the American legal 
system.404 
While class actions such as the one presented to the court in Carrera 
expend significant judicial resources and result in little recovery for class 
members, the novel approach to ascertainability tips the balance too far in 
favor of defendants.  In light of its limited resources, the federal judiciary 
rightly emphasizes conservation of judicial resources.  While this should 
and likely will remain a main concern of the judiciary, courts should also be 
concerned with administering justice efficiently.405  Ascertainability, if used 
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to both ensure future claim preclusion and guarantee that those harmed by a 
defendant’s conduct receive any damages, allows for both justice and 
efficient uses of the court system. 
If courts are unable to determine the members of class litigation, then it 
will also be nearly impossible to determine who is bound by the preclusive 
effect of any judgment.406  Ascertainability should serve primarily as a 
requirement to ensure the workability of claim preclusion.  Because class 
actions bind any member of the class to any final and valid judgment, class 
members who have not opted out are precluded from relitigating the 
identical claim.407  If later courts cannot determine precisely who is bound 
by an earlier judgment, then claim preclusion does not adequately prevent 
absent class members from attempting to relitigate a claim.408  Soon after a 
motion for class certification, courts must use ascertainability as a test to 
determine the feasibility of claim preclusion in relation to the class 
definition. 
Using ascertainability simply as an early measure of the effectiveness of 
claim preclusion is a lower bar to meet than that set by the Third Circuit.  
Plaintiffs should only need to show that a court can determine based on 
objective criteria who is a member of the class, and that any class members 
will be claim precluded from bringing the same claim in a future case.  An 
inability to show that a future court will be able to identify someone as a 
class member should result in a failure to satisfy ascertainability.409  A class 
definition based on objective terms under most circumstances then satisfies 
this requirement.  Consider Boundas—if a future court can see that a 
plaintiff had received a gift card to Abercrombie & Fitch between certain 
dates, then that court can easily identify this individual as a class member of 
a prior class and therefore bound by the judgment.410  But when a class 
definition, such as the one in Simer v. Rios that included members 
“discouraged” from applying for assistance, does not allow a court to easily 
recognize who is bound by the class judgment, then ascertainability as it 
relates to claim preclusion fails.411  The class definition in Simer would not 
have allowed later courts to determine who was bound by a class judgment, 
and, therefore, who would have been claim precluded.412  Thus, if a court is 
unable to determine who would be claim precluded as a result of class 
adjudication, then judicial economy is not properly served and the class 
should not be certified. 
For a class definition to satisfy ascertainability, a court must look at two 
factors:  (1) Is the class definition based on objective terms that will easily 
allow a court to identify someone as a class member?  And (2) does the 
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class definition adequately ensure that all class members will be precluded 
from bringing the identical claim in a later proceeding?  If both questions 
are answered in the affirmative, then ascertainability has been satisfied.  A 
failure to fulfill either requirement would mean that a class is not 
ascertainable and therefore the class definition must fail.  Further, if a class 
definition passes both prongs, the court will likely be able to identify those 
individuals actually harmed by the defendant’s conduct.  In most cases, the 
emphasis should be on the first question, because the use of objective terms 
in the class definition is a necessary predicate to ensure the ability to 
identify class members bound by the judgment. 
Because members of any properly certified Rule 23 class are bound by a 
judgment, ascertainability then should apply to all variations of Rule 23 
class actions.  While some courts emphasize ascertainability only in relation 
to Rule 23(b)(3), if ascertainability is meant to ensure judicial efficiency, 
then it necessarily should apply to all classes.  Applying ascertainability to 
all Rule 23 classes is in line with Rule 23’s overall goal of promoting 
efficient adjudication of claims.413 
The Third Circuit’s concern with efficiency and frivolous class actions 
was likely motivation for applying ascertainability in such a way as to 
safeguard against those concerns.414  But utilizing ascertainability to require 
that a court be able to identify all class members renders the manageability 
consideration of superiority as surplusage.  If a court finds that a class 
action is not efficient because class members cannot be identified through 
the use of records or a claims process, then it can deny class certification 
based on manageability concerns.415  “[W]hether the court is likely to face 
difficulties managing a class action bears on whether the proposed class 
satisfies the predominance and superiority requirements.”416  Transforming 
ascertainability into a requirement demanding that a class action be 
administratively feasible diminishes the superiority inquiry.  While 
ascertainability is intertwined with manageability, the two are distinct 
concepts in relation to class certification.417  Ascertainability turns on the 
definition of the proposed class, whereas manageability assesses the 
practical problems that may render a class action inappropriate.418 
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CONCLUSION 
Ascertainability developed as a doctrine to ensure that courts can 
determine who is bound by a class judgment.419  Maintaining it as such 
focuses courts’ attention to the definition of a class and ensures that 
plaintiffs attempt only to certify classes with a precise definition.  While 
individual identification is an appropriate concern of courts, ascertainability 
defines the contours of who is bound by a class judgment and therefore a 
member of the class. 
Recent developments in the Third Circuit have called into question the 
viability of Rule 23 in small-claims consumer class actions.420  The Third 
Circuit has established that ascertainability requires plaintiffs to identify an 
administratively feasible mechanism that allows the court to identify all 
putative class members.421  In most, if not all, small-claims consumer class 
actions, this requirement would be extremely difficult to satisfy.422 
While the Third Circuit is not the first court to deny class certification 
based on ascertainability, the need to identify each individual plaintiff is a 
novel approach.423  Traditionally, ascertainability has demanded that 
plaintiffs present the court with a precise class definition.424  Based on the 
class definition, courts must be able to readily identify absent class 
members.425  This means that a court must be able to identify whether 
someone could be a class member based on objective criteria.426  An 
inability to identify potential class members based on the class definition 
must result in a failure to satisfy ascertainability.427  The traditional 
application of ascertainability weeds out imprecise class definitions that do 
not allow for proper representative litigation to occur. 
Although the Third Circuit’s understanding of ascertainability will likely 
prevent many frivolous class action lawsuits, this interpretation does not 
properly apply the requirement.  Ascertainability developed in response to 
class definitions that prohibited a court from identifying class members 
absent individualized findings of fact.428  Such class definitions would 
prevent proper distribution of damages and determinations by future courts 
about who is bound by a valid judgment.429  In this regard, the doctrine 
promoted the efficient use of Rule 23. 
Because class certification often results in settlement, little discussion of 
ascertainability exists at the circuit level.430  The growing use of 
ascertainability to deny class certification is an important topic that 
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demands more attention from circuit courts.  The Third Circuit decisions 
are important examples of the questions that remain regarding the exact 
application of ascertainability.  Different understandings of the requirement 
will result in class certification in some circuits but not others.  The 
potential bar to certification that the Third Circuit’s interpretation of 
ascertainability has created should push more circuits to further flesh out 
the requirement.  Any failure to do so may lead to a significant increase in 
the denial of class certification based on ascertainability. 
 
